When Donald Trump returned to the Oval Office, one of his stated priorities was reducing U.S. dependence on China’s dominance of the so-called “rare earths” supply chain. These are the 17 or so elements – like neodymium, dysprosium and terbium – that power everything from electric car motors to jet-engine magnets to data-centre infrastructure. China mines about 70% of the world’s rare-earth minerals and refines roughly 90% of the supply chain.
Wikipedia
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Bloomberg
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Trump’s blueprint has two main tracks: first, strike deals with trusted allies and resource-rich partners to diversify supply; second, rapidly scale up domestic U.S. mining, processing and manufacturing. But six months into his second term, reality is setting in: deals are slow, domestic infrastructure is lagging, and China remains in the driver’s seat.
The strategic imperative
China’s move earlier this year to impose tight export controls on key heavy rare-earth elements and permanent magnets – in effect using its supply-chain monopoly as a geopolitical lever – sounded alarms in Washington.
Le Monde.fr
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For Trump, this was a national-security challenge: if adversaries can weaponise access to critical minerals, the U.S. defence and technology sectors are exposed.
In response, the White House recently announced a landmark agreement with Australia: an US$8.5 billion critical-minerals pact to develop rare-earth mining and processing projects together.
AP News
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Trump declared that “in about a year from now we’ll have so much critical mineral … you won’t know what to do with them.” The deal illustrates the ambition. But ambition is not execution.
Why momentum is slow
Firstly, mining and processing rare earths is hard and time-consuming. Even where ore exists, regulatory hurdles, environmental concerns, infrastructure bottlenecks and capital intensity delay projects. For example, while the U.S. has the MP Materials Mountain Pass mine in California, ramping up refiners and magnet-manufacturing capabilities still lags behind China.
Wikipedia
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Secondly, even with partners like Australia, the chain isn’t seamless. Many mines produce raw ore, but processing and magnet-manufacturing remain heavily reliant on China. Australia itself lacks large-scale processing capacity.
Wikipedia
Trump’s timetable appears overly optimistic.
Thirdly, China has responded swiftly and strategically, tightening export licensing, and embedding its supply-chain dominance as leverage in trade negotiations.
TIME
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In short: the game is moving against the U.S. faster than the U.S. is executing.
The implications for Trump’s strategy
For Trump, the inability to move quickly has several knock-on effects. Domestically, the “Make America Rare-Again” narrative risks being exposed as hollow if supply shortfalls persist. Internationally, allies and industry may become impatient if alternative supply chains are promised but not delivered. Moreover, China’s ability to retain its grip gives Beijing an enduring strategic advantage in tech and defence supply chains.
Still, the Australian deal is a step in the right direction—but it is not a silver bullet. Trump must now shift from announcing splashy deals to driving implementation: fast-tracking regulatory approval, mobilising investment, incentivising U.S. domestic industry, and prioritising full value-chain integration (mine to magnets to manufacturing).
Conclusion
Trump’s goal – breaking China’s rare-earth monopoly – is both necessary and bold. But ambition alone isn’t enough. With China acting swiftly, and the supply-chain targets being complex and slow to materialise, the U.S. is running to catch up. Unless execution accelerates, the gap between rhetoric and reality may widen, handing China a strategic edge while damaging Trump’s own credibility in industrial and national-security arenas.